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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HA ROLD R. RAINFORD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WILLIAM R. RYTTING and 
AlTZANNE H. RYTTING, 
Defendants and Appellarnts. 
Case 
No.11476 
BRIEF O,F APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal by the defendants and appellants, 
\\'illiam R. and Suzanne H. Rytting, from a Summary 
.Tndg-ment granted in favor of Harold D. Rainford, plain-
tiff and respondent, by the Third District Court in and 
for 8H It Lake County. The Honorable Stewart M. Han-
-;on, .J uclge, granted the Summary Judgment on the 16th 
d<1:i' of April, 1968. 
The Summary Judgment was granted apparently on 
'1 11· g"roumls and for the reasons that there were no issues 
1 
of fact based on the pleadings and Affiadvits on file, an1; 
further, that the defendants' and appellants' position on 
the questions of law was without merit. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants and appellants seek to han~ the deeisio11 
of the District Court granting the Summary .Jndgm<'Ht 
reversed and the matter remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF F AC'l1S 
On the 30th day of March, 1965, "\Villiam R. and Su-
zanne H. Rytting and Harold D. Rainford, as the 011!1 
three organizing directors, formed a corporation in Yaki-
ma, ·Wahington, called The Carriage House, Inc., for th1· 
purpose of engaging in the retail and ·wholesale merchan-
dising business. Suzanne H. Rytting ·was elected Pre~i­
clent, ·William R. Rytting was elected Vice-Presidrllt, a11d 
Harold D. Rainford, Secretary-Treasurer. 
The corporation had 500 shares of $100.00 par rnlu 1• 
capital stock authorized, and there were only 90 shartis ut 
said stock outstanding on or about the 27th da~T of ~f :i.1 
1966. The directors-officers of the corporation solel.1 
owned the oustanding stock in the following amouHt~ 
Suzanne H. Rytting, 33 shares; "'William R. Rytting-, 3~ 
shares, and Rainford owned 25 shares. 
On the 27th day of :iiay, 1966, the Ryttings on ],, 
half of The Carriage House, Inc., and Rainford, e11trrl' 11 
into a Conditional Sale of Stock Agreement (herri11aft 1 ' 
referred to as the "Agreement") whereby The Carria!o!· 
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llousP, Ine., would purchase Rainford's 25 shares of 
' [ 1 l('k at par value (or for a total of $2,500.00). The pur-
pose for entering into the Agreement was to attempt to 
wind nv the corporate business and affairs in the State 
of Washington and terminate the corporate structure. 
Tlte H>·ttings planned to return to the State of Utah, 
nnd Rainford desired to remain in Washington. 
At the time of the Agreement and prior thereto, the 
t·orporation was insolvent; its liabilities exceeded its 
assets and it was unable to pay its debts in the usual 
1·1rnrse of business. There was, in fact, no earned or 
pairl in surplus with which to attempt to purchase the 
stoek that the corporation had issued to Rainford. 
F~nrther, at the time of the execution of the Agree-
mr11t, the corporation had on hand certain assets con-
~isiing of various items of operating equipment and fix-
1111<•s including an air conditioner, valued at approxi-
m1t1d» $1,200.00, along with various accounts receivable 
i11 tlir approximate sum of $500.00. Pursuant to an ex-
plieit ag-reement and understanding, these items were 
'··ft h~· tlw Ryttings at the corporate place of business in 
Ynkima, \Vashington, under the control and supervision 
of Rainford. The proceeds from the sale of these assets 
111'n· to be used as an offset or credit against the $2,500.00 
1111relrnse price of Rainford 's shares of stock. 
rl'l1is understanding was arrived at prior to, and 
1 ·xi~te<l contemporaneously with the execution of the 
.\:.;rc·c·ment preYiously referred to; it was definitely un-
il1•r-;tootl by the parties that the funds derived from the 
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sale of the equipment and fixtures and collection of the 
accounts receivable would be applied as an offset or 
credit against the purchase price of the stock above re-
ferred to. 
Subsequent to the execution of the Agreement, the 
Ryttings left the State of Washington and retmned to 
Utah, leaving the equipment, fixtures and accounts re-
ceivable within the control and supervision of the Olle 
remaining officer, director and shareholder in vV ashing-
ton, Harold D. Rainford. 
Iu May, 1967, Rainford referred the matter from 1 
"\Vashington to Golden W. Robbins, Esp., for collectio11 
and a Complaint was filed for the entire $2,500.00, plus 
interest and attorney's fees, with no referenc to the av 
proximate $1,700.00 offset to which defendants-appellanb 
are entitled. In spite of the Answer, Affidavits, Answer~ 
to Interrogatories, Admissions, and Counter-AffidaYitR, ' 
filed on behalf of defendants-appellants, raising amollg 
other issues, the factual issue of the offset, a Summary 
Judgment was granted in favor of plaintiff-respondent 
Rainford, for the full amount prayed for, from which thi' 
appeal is taken. 
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ARGU1fENT 
POINT I 
IT vV AS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
GRANT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
O.B, RAINFORD AND AGAINST THE RYT-
TINGS AS THERE EXISTED A GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS RAISED BY 
THE PLEADINGS ON FILE HEREIN. 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953, as 
amended, provides: 
•'The Judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if ... there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact .... " 
This direction requires by its terms and by intepre-
tation that the evidence, admissions and inferences sup-
porting the Motion for Summary Judgment be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the loser; such showing must 
pn'clucle all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if 
g-in~n a trial, produce evidence which would reason-
ably sustain a judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Des-
ert Dndge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Ut. 2d 1, 354, P.2d 
.-i.)9; F'rederick May and Company, Inc., v. Dunn, 13 
[t. 2d 40, 328 P.2d 266; and more recently, Sumner 
.!. Hatch, et al. v. Sugarhouse Finance Company, Case 
:\o. 10807 filed December 1, 1967 (not yet cited in Utah 
HqJorts). 
The pleadings on file herein put in issue the f a.ctual 
1J11c·stio11 of whether or not an understanding or agree-
nwnt existed at the time of the execution of the Condi-
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tional Sale of Stock Agreement, ·whereby an offset or 
credit (for the funds received from the sale or use of the 
corporate fL."'\:tures and equipment remaining under the 
supervision and control of Rainford) was to be applied to 
the purchase price of Rainford 's stock. And further, 
whether the amounts to be collected from the account' 
receivable would likewise be used. 
William R. Rytting, by his Answer, Admissions and 
Answers to Interrogatories, Second Admissions and An-
swers to Interrogatories, Affidavit of October 26, 196i, 
and Affidavit of April 15, 1968, explicitly alleges that 
Harold D. Rainford as an officer, director, and sharehold-
er of the corporation had, and still has control of the 
fixtures, equipment and air conditioner of the corporation 
and control of the accounts receivable; further, that the 
proceeds to be derived therefrom were to be applied as 
an off set against the balance allegedly owing on the pur-
chase price of the stock. Rytting also avers that thrn· 
was a specific condition and understanding between tlw 
parties to the Agreement that the approximate value of i 
these fixtures and air conditioner was the sum of 
$1,200.00; that the approximate value of the accounts re-
ceivable owing to the corporation was $500.00; and that 
these assets were left in the control and supervision of i 
Harold D. Rainford when the Ryttings returned to Utah. 
In Harold D. Rainford 's Counter-Affidavit of Febru-
ary 8, 1968, he specifically states that the condition awl 
agreement regarding the fixtures, equipment awl nc-
counts receivable described in Rytting 's AffidaYit a ho1 L'-
rcf erred to did not exist at any time; that the account~ ' . 
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receivable were never the subject of any agreement be-
tween the parties. 
A comparison of these pertinent prov1s1ons of the 
Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits referred to, reveals an 
ohvious factual issue which needs to be resolved. 
There is indeed an issue of fact raised in opposition 
to plaintiff-respondent's :Motion for Summary Judgment 
and therefore the same should not have been granted. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
THAT THE CONDITIONAL SALE OF STOCK 
AGREEMENT WAS AND IS ILLEGAL AND 
THUS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
The acquisition or purchase of its own stock by a 
corporation while insolvent or when the transaction will 
render it insolvent is invalid. 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corpora-
tions, Section 1000. 
A number of cases support the proposition that a 
('urporation may, in the absence of statutory or charter 
restrictions, purchase its own stock, provided it acts in 
goocl faith and is neither insolvent nor in the process of 
dissolution; and provided such purchases are not preju-
dicial to the rights of its creditors or stockholders. Under 
this rule, a corporation may sell stock with an agreement 
or option to repurchase it; or it may purchase its own 
-.:tock for the purpose of effecting a reduction of its capital 
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stock; or it may receive a donation of its own stock; or a 
corporation authorized by its charter to act as a trustee, 
may hold its ow11 stock in trust for beneficiaries designat-
ed by the donor. Ibid, Section 997. 
The State of Washington adopted the Model Busi-
ness Corpora ti on Act which took effect July 1, 1967. 
Prior to that time, the Washington Code section dealing 
with the purchase and reacquisition of a corporation'~ 
own stock was Section 23.01.120 (2). The language of 
that section is as follows: 
''Every corporation organized hereunder shall 
have the power to purchase, hold, sell and transfer 
shares of its own capital stock; provided, that no 
such corporation shall use its funds or property 
for the purchase of its own shares of capital stock 
when such use would cause an impairment of the 
capital stock of the corporation." 
The leading 1N ashington cases dealing with this 
point of law are Schwab v. Getty, 145 Wash. 66, 258 Pac. 
1035, 54 A.L.R. 1382; and Jackson v. Colagrossi, 50 Wash. 
2d 572, 313 P.2d 697 (1957). 
In the Jackson case, the evidence sustained the find-
ing that there was no earned surplus to pay for the re-
purchase of the corporation's own stock; that the corpo-
ration 'ms unable to pay its debts in the usual course nf 
business and that the corporation was rendered insolYent 
by the repurchase. The Court stated that a repurclrn~e 
agreement by a corporation of its own shares of stock can 
only occur when it would not diminish the corporaton '.' 
ability to pay its debts or lessen the security of its cn•di-
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tors by reducing the amount of assets of the corporation 
below the amount represented by aggregate outstanding 
shares of capita] stock of the corporation; and payments 
made by the corporation to certain of its stockholders in 
the purchase of its own stock may be recovered from such 
:;;tockholders where such payments impaired the corpora-
tion's capital stock and did not then have sufficient earned 
surplus with which to pay therefor. 
The foregoing ratiouale has been annotated at 47 
.\.L.R. 2d 763 as follows: 
"A purchase or acquisition of its own stock by a 
corporation while insolvent or when the transac-
tion will render it insolvent is a violation of the 
rights of its creditors and is invalid .... If an ob-
ligation of the corporation has been given by it in 
return for the stock either the corporation or a 
representative of creditors may defend against 
its enforcement; it cannot be proved as a debt 
with general creditors in liquidation. In this gen-
eral rule the insolvency referred to is a conditoin 
of having debts greater than assets." 
The Ryttings have alleged without contradiction in 
their Answer, Affidavits, and Counter-Affidavits, that the 
Conditional Sale of Stock Agreement was and is void and 
illegal under the laws of thke State of Washington for 
the reasons that at the time of the execeution of said 
.\g-reement the corporation's liabilities exceeded its as-
~ds; i.e., the corporation was unable to pay its debts in the 
nsual course of business. The corporation had, in fact, 
no paid in surplus, undistributed earned profits or sur-
plus with which to attempt to purchase its own stock. 
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The affiia11t fnrthrr alleges that Rainford, being an officer, 
director and shareholder, was well aware, or should han• 
been well aware of the corporate financial condition. 
Rainford as an officer and director had a fiduciary obli-
gati011 to The Carriage House, Inc., to inform himself as 
to the financial condition of the corporation, and, had 
he done so he would have been aware that it was 1sith-
out the necessary funds with which to enter into a stock 
purchase agreement. Therefore, in view of the authori-
ties cited ahon~, the Agreement was void and thus 
unenforceable. 
The Ryttings allegedly guaranteed performance of 
the Agreement between Rainford and The Carriage 
House, Inc., howen'r, there is abundant authority for the 
fundamental proposition that a guarantor cannot be held 
if the principal obligation is invalid. Krekel v. Thomas-
111a, 253 l\Iich. 28~1, 328 N.W. 285, 81 A.L.R. 786. 
The leading "'Washington case regarding the validit:· 
of guarantees is Robey v. TValtou Lumber Company, li 
\Vash. 2d 242, 133 P.2d 95, 145 A.L.R. 924, wherein the 
Court stated: 
''A 'gnaralltee' being a collateral engagement for 
performance of an undertaking: of another imports 
existence of an obligation of thE' principal debtor 
and of the guarantor, and if a primary or princi-
pal obligation docs not exist, there can hr 110 
gna ran tee.'' 
The alleged guarantee by the R~-ttings of the i11Ynl1d 
Agreement is equally unenforceable. 
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CONCLUSION 
It seems evident from a comparison of the pleadings, 
Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits, which have been filed 
in this matter, that a clear factual question is in issue. 
That issue is, was there an outstanding agreement sup-
plt>mental to the Conditional Sale of Stock Agreement, 
rPgarding an offset or credit to be given toward the pur-
t'hase priee of Rainford 's stock. The amount of the credit 
heing the reasonable value of the fixtures, equipment, air 
eonditioner, and accounts receivable, remaining in the 
possession of the only stockholder, officer and director of 
the corporation remaining in the State of \Vashington, 
i.e., Harold D. Rainford. This question is an issue of 
fact which cannot be resolved by the Court, but should be 
trircl to a jury. 
As to the merits of the decision that the contract 
under consideration was apparently legal and valid, it is 
dt>ar that under the law applicable to the case, a pur-
ported attempt by a corporation to purchase its own 
stock, while, in fact, it had no unditributed earnings, prof-
its, or earned surplus with which to do so, was invalid, 
;111d m1enforceable, as was the purported personal guar-
an1Pe by the Ryttings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Attorneys for Defendamts 
and Appellants 
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